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Abstract
We use an efficiency wage framework to analyze tax reforms that leave the tax wedge
unaffected both in the case of constant and endogenous outside options. An increase in
the wage tax rate and a reduction of the payroll tax such that the ratio of gross wage rate
to net-of-tax wage remains constant, does not affect the labour market allocation. But an
increase in the wage tax rate and a reduction of the payroll tax such that the sum of the tax
rates remains unaffected, lowers employment and in the long-run Nash equilibrium with
endogenous outside option the policy reform also lowers effort.
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1. Introduction
The “most basic theorem of public finance” (see e.g. Blinder 1988) states that the incidence of
labor taxes is independent of whether the tax is levied on employers or employees meaning that
it is the overall burden rather than the formal composition of the burden that matters. This
theorem has recently been questioned for several reasons. First, it is emphasized that when
payroll taxes and wage taxes have a different tax base due to tax exemptions, the composition
of labor taxes matter (Koskela and Schöb 1999). Second, non-linear taxes may affect the
incidence of payroll taxes and wage taxes in different ways (Picard and Toulemonde 2002).
Third, when unemployment benefit payments are subject to income taxes, the composition of
labor taxes also affects the labor market outcome (Goerke 2000).
In this paper we abstract from these sources of non-equivalence by focusing on a linear ad
valorem payroll tax s and a linear ad valorem wage tax t, which both have the same tax base.
The gross wage rate is )1( swwg +=  and the net-of-tax wage is )1( twwn -= . The difference
between gross wage and net-of-tax wage, )( stw + , determines the tax wedge. Often, however,
it is the sum of the tax rates st + , which is used to define the tax wedge. For instance, Nickell
and Layard (1999, p. 3037) “expect the labor market consequences of taxation to operate via
the sum of the three1 tax rates” (also see Nickell 2003). Goerke (2000), by contrast defines the
wedge as the ratio of gross wages and net-of-tax wage, i.e. as )1/()1( ts -+ . We will show that
in an efficiency wage framework, only the latter definition will sustain the equivalence result.
The composition of labor taxes matters when focusing on the sum of labor tax rates. In this
case a tax system with higher income tax and lower payroll taxes will generate higher
unemployment and less work effort.
The following section sets up the model. In section 3 we analyze tax reforms that leave the
tax wedge unaffected for both definitions of the tax wedge. We distinguish between the
reaction in case of constant outside options and the case of endogenous outside options.
Section 4 concludes.
1 They also include a consumption tax rate, which we do not consider here.
22. Model framework and comparative statics
We consider a standard efficiency wage model where firms can determine both wages and
employment. The time sequence of decisions is shown in figure 1. The government behaves as
a Stackelberg leader, which sets the ad valorem payroll tax rate s and the ad valorem wage tax
t in the first stage. Since we do not allow for tax exemptions the tax base w is the same for
both tax rates.
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When the tax policy is announced in the first stage, firms behave as Stackelberg leaders with
respect to workers. They decide in the 2nd stage on the wage rate w and the employment level
L, taken the tax parameters as given. When the net-of-tax wage rate exceeds the outside option
of workers, 0>- bwn , workers accept any job offered at the wage rate w. On the job, they
can decide upon the effort e they put into their work. As effort increases the disutility of
working, workers have an incentive to shirk in the work place. Firms face the problem that
they cannot perfectly monitor effort, but they can offset the incentive to shirk by paying higher
wages, since this raises the penalty for shirking workers who are caught and fired.
We proceed by using backward induction and start our analysis with the 3rd stage of the
game, in which the wage rate, employment, and taxes are already determined.
Effort determination
The preferences of the representative worker can be described by a utility function U that is
additively separable and quasi-linear, )()1()1())1(1( egbedtwedU --+---= , where d
denotes the exogenously given probability of monitoring workers, b  denotes the workers’
outside option, which is explained in more details below, and )(eg  denotes the disutilty from
effort. Total working time per worker is fixed and normalized to unity. Effort is normalized
such that we have ]1,0[Îe . For 1=e  we do not observe any shirking and thus have a zero
3probability of being laid off, i.e. 0)1( =- ed . The utility function then simplifies to
).1()1( gtwU --=
We assume that the disutility of effort is a convex function, i.e. .0)(''),(' >egeg  The first-
order condition for effort is then 0)(')( =--= egbwdU ne . Using the parameterization
1,)( >q= qeeg  yields the following effort function
(1) a-= )( bwAe n ,
where )1/(1)( -qq= dA  is constant, )1/(1 -q=a , and )1( twwn -= . Effort is a concave function
of the difference between the net-of-tax wage rate and the workers’ outside option so that we
have 1<a . The comparative statics of the effort function is straightforward. Effort is
increasing in the net-of-tax wage rate so that we have 0<te  and 0>we , and decreasing in the
outside option 0<be .
2
Wage setting and labor demand
In the 2nd stage of the game, each firm takes the tax parameters as given and decides about the
wage rate w and labor demand L . Production depends on effective labor input eL  so that the
production function for the representative firm can be written as )(eLf  with 0)(' >eLf  and
.0)('' <eLf  The output price is normalized to unity and profits are defined by
LsweLf )1()( +-=p . Profit maximization subject to the effort function (1) yields the well-
known Solow-condition (Solow 1979) 1=ewew , according to which the wage elasticity of
effort is equal to one, i.e. the condition also applies in the presence of wage and payroll taxes.
The outside option b of the worker is determined by the average net-of-tax wage rate
)1( tw -  in the economy, the unemployment benefit payments b , and the probability with
which a fired worker finds employment or stays unemployed. The unemployment benefits
normally consist of a component that is related to the wage income and a component not
related to wage income. Only the former may be subject to income taxation. This is the case
analyzed by Goerke (2000). For the sake of the argument we set the proportional part equal to
2 We can allow for a more general utility function that is concave in terms of rents and convex in terms of
disutility of effort. Results are qualitatively similar and available upon request.
4zero and only focus on exogenously given unemployment benefit payments. Following the
standard approach in the efficiency wage models (cf. e.g. Summers 1988), the probability of
finding a job equals the employment rate )1( u- , where u defines the unemployment rate in the
economy. In what follows we consider the case of k identical firms. By normalizing total labor
supply to unity, the unemployment rate is given by kLu -=1 . Thus the outside option of the
representative firm becomes buutwb +--= )1)(1( . From the viewpoint of a single firm, the
outside option of its respective workers is not affected by its wage setting behavior. From the
effort function (1), we can thus derive an explicit solution for the optimal wage rate set by the
single firm:
(2)
)1)(1( a--
=
t
bw .
The comparative statics of the wage function shows that the wage rate w is affected by the
outside option and the wage tax, 0>bw  and 0>tw , but is not directly affected by the payroll
tax s. For the labor demand function, we use the parametric specification e-e= )()( 1 eLeLf
with 1<e  denoting the revenue share of labor and )1( e-  the profit share, respectively. The
labor demand function is given by
(3) [ ] 1)1( -dd-+= eswL ,
where 1)1(1 >e-ºd  and .)1(1 e>e-eº-d  The comparative statics of labor demand shows
that the wage tax t only affects labor demand via the effort determination. Changes in the
payroll tax s do not affect effort but affect the gross wage rate. The wage rate w affects labor
demand in two different ways: there is a negative direct effect of the wage rate and a positive
indirect effect of the wage rate via effort. The former effect dominates so that a higher wage
rate w cet. par. unambiguously decreases labor demand:
(4) [ ] [ ] .0)1()1()1()1( 211 <-=-d++++d-= -dd--d-d-
w
LeesweswsL ww
The optimal employment level is such that the labor demand elasticity is equal to 1- . To
derive the general equilibrium result we use the fact that with symmetric firms, the average
wage rate equals the wage rate each single firm sets. The general equilibrium condition is:
5(5) 0
))(1(
=
a--
-
ut
buw .
Substituting the labor demand function in the definition of the unemployment rate, we have
(6) [ ] 0)1(1 1 =+-- -dd- eswku .
Together with the effort function (1) we thus have three equations (1), (5) and (6), and three
unknown variables e, w, and u.
3. Changing the tax wedge structure
In what follows we consider two different changes in the composition of the tax wedge that
leaves the marginal tax wedge constant. First we follow the definition of Goerke (2000) and
consider a reform that leaves the ratio of gross wage rate and net-of-tax wage rate unaffected.
This is the case when dttsds ])1()1[( -+-= .
To show that such a change in the composition of labor taxes leaves the allocation
unaffected, we look at the case where firms consider an exogenous outside option b. From (2)
we get )1( twwt -=  so that the net-of-tax wage remains constant, 0])1([ =--= dtwtwdw t
n
and work effort remains unchanged. The gross wage rate also remains constant, since
0)]1/()1[()1( =-+-+= tswswdw t
g  so that employment does not change. This, in turn
ensures that the outside option b does not change so that the initial allocation establishes a new
Nash-equilibrium.
RESULT 1 (CONSTANT RATIO): An increase in the wage tax rate t and a reduction of
the payroll tax s such that the ratio of gross wage rate to net-of-tax wage remains constant,
does not affect the labor market allocation.
From result 1, it follows immediately that for bkLwkLstG )1()( --+=  the tax reform is
revenue-neutral so that we can state the following corollary:
COROLLARY 1: A revenue-neutral increase in the wage tax rate t and a reduction of the
payroll tax s does not affect the labor market allocation.
6Next we turn to the second definition of the tax wedge, i.e. that the tax wedge is determined by
the sum of the tax rates. According to this definition, a tax reform that leaves the wedge
constant is given by dsdt -= . To compare the results with the previous one, we also start with
the case where the firms consider a constant outside option.
Constant outside option
As before, the wage tax w is only affected by the wage tax rate so that we have )1( twwt -=
and consequently 0])1([ =--= dtwtwdw t
n . Hence, for a constant outside option, effort is
not affected at all, i.e. 0=
-= dsdt
dtde . The gross wage unambiguously rises since the reduction
of s is lower than in the first case:
(7) 0
1
)1( >÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ
-
+
=-+=
-=
t
tswwsw
dt
dw
t
dsdt
g
.
Since effort does not change, the only effect on the firm-specific employment level is the
increase of the gross wage rate. The employment effect is given by:
(8) 0
)1)(1(
)(
<
+-
+
d-=-+=
-= st
tsLLwLL
dt
dL
stwt
dsdt
.
RESULT 2 (CONSTANT SUM): For given outside option, an increase in the wage tax rate
t and a reduction of the payroll tax s such that the sum of the tax rate remains unaffected,
lowers employment but leaves the effort level unaffected.
The outside option does not remain constant in the long run since unemployment rises and, for
a constant net-of-tax wage rate in other firms, the outside option falls. Result 2 does not
establish a Nash-equilibrium so that we have to further investigate the tax reform by looking at
the general equilibrium in which the outside option is determined endogenously.
General equilibrium analysis
When a firm determines its optimal employment level, it takes the unemployment rate u as
given. A higher unemployment rate, however, lowers the outside option. This increases effort
and reduces the wage set by the firm. To analyze the total effect, including these feedback
7effects, we investigate the equation system (1), (5), and (6). The determinant D of the equation
system is always negative (see Appendix). We can sign the following effects. First, the
unemployment unambiguously rises due to the reform:
(9) [ ] 0)(1 >-++-= -
-=
stewewt
dsdt
ueueuuwD
dt
du .
The effort of worker decreases:
(10) [ ] 0)()(1 <-+--+= -
-=
wtsuwttwtwsu
dsdt
uwueeweueeuwD
dt
de .
For the wage rate w, we have the following condition:
(11) [ ] 0)(11 >-++-= --
-=
tesuuett
dsdt
euuweuwDwD
dt
dw .
The direct effect is positive. If a>+- )1/()1( st , the second term that covers the indirect
effect of unemployment via wage formation and effort, is positive as well.3 The result is
summarized in the second result:
RESULT 3 (ENDOGENOUS SUM): In the long-run Nash equilibrium, an increase in the
wage tax rate t and a reduction of the payroll tax s, such that the sum of the tax rate remains
unaffected, lowers employment and work effort.
For a constant outside option, the net-of-tax wage rate and effort are not affected by the
reform. Taking the change in the outside option into account, however, the effect on
unemployment becomes important. First, we can show that the net-of-tax wage rate falls:
(12) 0)1()1( <-=--ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
+=
-=-=-= dsdt
u
dsdt
ut
dsdt
n
dt
duwtwt
dt
duww
dt
dw .
While the direct effects cancel out, the indirect effect due to the change in the unemployment
rate ensures that the net-of-tax wage rate falls. The outside option b also falls since both the
unemployment rate rises and the net-of-tax wage rate falls. Effort, however, will only fall if the
difference between the net-of tax wage rate and the outside option decreases. Rewriting
3 Note that a is always smaller than the unemployment rate. For mark-ups below 30 percent, it can be deduced
from equation (6) that a is only a fourth of the unemployment rate or even less.
8equation (2) as )1()1( twbtw -a=-- , it can be seen immediately that the difference is
proportional to the net-of-tax wage rate so that the difference between the net-of tax wage rate
and the outside option also falls. When effort falls, cet. par. employment falls since the
marginal productivity of workers becomes smaller. The total employment effect is even
stronger since the gross wage also rises, i.e. we have 0>
-= dsdt
gdw . The main reason for this
apparently paradox result is the following. Even though we keep the sum of the tax rate )( st +
is constant, the total wedge between the gross wage and the net-of-tax wage rate, )( stw + ,
increases since the tax base w increases.
Finally we turn to the government budget constraint, which is given by
bkLwkLstG )1()( --+= , where .)1( ubkL =-  Now the total differentiation yields
( ) ( ).)()()()()( dsLdtLwdwLbkdsLdtLwdwwLLkstwkLdsdtdG stwstw +++++++++=  The
first term is zero and we know from the first-order condition of the firm that 0=+ wwLL .
Thus the total effect on the budget constraint is given by:
)1()1)(1(
)1()()())()((
t
Lbk
st
sstbG
dt
dw
w
LbkLLbkkwst
dt
dG
dsdt
st
dsdt -
-
+-
+-+d
+-=--++=
-=-=
.
The term )/()1( sts ++ is below 2 in most cases. Since 1)1(1 >e-ºd , where e indicates the
cost share of labor, empirically, d is larger than 2 so that the first term of the right-hand side
will likely to be negative. The second term is always negative and will be the larger in absolute
terms the larger the unemployment benefit payements are. Thus we can expect public revenues
to fall.4
4. Concluding remarks
In an efficiency wage framework, we analyzed tax reforms that leave the tax wedge unaffected
by distinguishing between the reaction in the case of constant outside options and the case of
endogenous outside options. A tax reform that keeps the ratio of gross wage rate to net-of-tax
wage constant, does not affect the labor market allocation. A reform that keeps the sum of the
labor tax rate constant, however, lowers employment and effort in the long-run Nash
4 Note that we would obtain the same condition for the case of exogenous outside option.
9equilibrium. The reason is that the tax reform, which leaves the sum of tax rates constant,
changes the marginal incentives for firms and workers and therefore affects wage formation.
This in turn changes the tax base for the two tax rates. The constant-ratio definition of the
wedge takes this tax base change into account and therefore correctly measures the tax wedge.
The constant-sum definition ignores this effect and therefore does not yield the basic theorem
of public finance that the incidence of labor taxes is independent of whether the tax is levied on
employers or employees. The precise definition therefore is important for both analytical and
empirical research in determining the impact the structure of labor taxation has on wage
formation and employment and to focus on the potential reasons such as different tax bases,
non-linear tax schedules and the taxation of unemployment benefit payments.
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Appendix
The effort function (1), the wage rate function (5) and the unemployment function (6) provide
the equation system in the general equilibrium case. The determinant is
(A1) [ ] 1
)(
)1)(1(1)1(1
1
1
01
-<
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--d+-ad
--=
-
--
-
=
uu
uu
uu
ee
w
D
ew
uw
u
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In terms of changes in t and s, we have the following equation systems, respectively:
(A2)
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By using Cramer’s rule, we obtain the following results
(i) [ ]uteeut weuuewDdt
dw
---= - )1(1 , [ ]suuwDds
dw
-= -1 ,
(A3) (ii) [ ])()1(1 wwutwut euewuweDdt
de
+---= - , [ ])(1 uuws eweuDds
de
+-= - ,
(iii) [ ]tewewt eueuuwDdt
du
-+-= - )(1 , [ ]suDds
du
-= -1 .
Thus the total effects for dsdt -= can be expressed as
(i) [ ])()1(1 tesuuet
dsdt
euuweuwD
dt
dw
-+--= -
-=
,
(A4) (ii) [ ])()(1 wtsuwttwtwsu
dsdt
uwueeweueeuwD
dt
de
-+--+= -
-=
,
(iii) [ ]stewewt
dsdt
ueueuuwD
dt
du
+-+-= -
-=
)(1 .
The gross wage increases since
dt
st
tswwdsdtswdw t
g
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)1)(1(
)1( .
Therefore unemployment raises accordingly as
.0
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